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* Bank of Italy, Economics, Research and International Relations.    1 Introduction
Household1 surveys are a classic source of data on income. For one thing, they improve upon
alternative sources, such as social security or tax records, in many respects: they do not
su⁄er from the censoring of low-income earners (e.g. due to tax thresholds); the concept of
income is not restricted to the base relevant for tax or social contribution payments but can
be the most inclusive one (e.g. including in-kind receipts); administrative sources are usually
found lacking in terms of an individual￿ s characteristics and the unit is the individual, with
no possibility of matching with information on other household members. On the other
hand, household surveys are a⁄ected by non-sampling errors. A bias due to the selection
into participation, which is usually not compulsory, is often at work. Moreover, response
error may arise because of underreporting, recording errors, di¢ culties in understanding
questions, and so on.
The paper studies the accuracy of data in economic surveys, in particular income data.
This is an important aspect in empirical research. It helps data users to understand the
results and limits of their analysis: for instance, response error could bias regression pa-
rameters for variables whose absolute values are biased; in cross-country comparisons, it
is important to know whether heterogeneities are due to di⁄erences in data quality or to
economic behaviours. Moreover, several policy recommendations are based on the analysis
of survey data and reliability issues are thus of great importance, not only for the scienti￿c
community, but also for policy makers and the general public. Finally, having a good un-
derstanding of the distribution of response errors - whether these errors are concentrated
in a few respondents or not, what are the characteristics of misreporters - can in fact help
data producers to improve the accuracy of their data.
Response error is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the objective truth relating to a
respondent￿ s income and what is reported about that income. The consequences of response
1We wish to thank Andrea Brandolini, Giovanni D￿ Alessio, Leandro D￿ Aurizio, Andrea Filippone, The-
sia Garner, Stefano Iezzi, Paolo Sestito, Ra⁄aele Tartaglia-Polcini, seminar participants at IARIW 2010
and two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions. The authors are responsible for any mis-
takes. The views expressed here are our own and do not necessarily re￿ ect those of the Bank of Italy.
Correspondence: Bank of Italy, Economics, Research and International Relations Area, via Nazionale 91,
00184 Rome, Italy. Tel: +39 06 4792 3872 Fax: +39 06 4792 4764. Email: andrea.neri@bancaditalia.it,
roberta.zizza@bancaditalia.it.
5errors are twofold. The ￿rst is bias, which a⁄ects the size and the sign of the discrepancy
between the actual and the reported amount earned. The second is variability or reliability,
which refers to the distribution of errors around their average values. Here we focus on
the issue of the potential bias due to response error. As we lack administrative records
to match exactly at the individual level, we develop a set of statistical exercises (some
original, some borrowed from previous work) to derive a set of proxies of response error for
each respondent.
The data set we rely upon is the Bank of Italy￿ s Survey on Household Income and
Wealth (hereinafter the SHIW), which is conducted biennially and is representative of the
Italian population (Banca d￿ Italia, 2006).
To motivate the paper, we assess the magnitude of response error in the 2004 edition
of the SHIW using external information published by the Italian National Statistical Insti-
tute (Istat) as a yardstick. A comparison of income estimates from the SHIW with those
from the national accounts (NA) shows that the distance between the two sources varies
substantially with the income type. In particular, data on payroll income and on income
from pensions replicate quite well the corresponding macro ￿gures, while data on income
from self-employment and capital tend to be less accurate (table 1).2 The same has been
found in a study by Biancotti et al. (2008), with regard to the issue of reliability. As to the
occupational status, table 2 shows that the number of workers (broken down into dependent
and self-employed) in the SHIW is of the same order of magnitude as that in the Labour
Force Survey and in the NA3; on the contrary, the number of dependent jobs held equaled
around 20 million in the NA, against 16.6 million in the SHIW (underestimated by almost
20 per cent; table 3). People earning from self-employment totaled 6.3 million in the SHIW
and around 11 million in the NA (underestimated by more than 40 per cent). Since the
micro and macro estimates for the main job are in line, this suggests that multiple positions
are underestimated.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature; Section 3 describes
2See the appendix for details on the methodology and on the results of the comparison exercise.
3The occupational status in the SHIW refers to the prevailing condition, that in the Labour Force Survey
to the condition in a reference week.
6the adjustment procedure and Section 4 shows its results, with a focus on the characteristics
of the misreporters; Section 5 concludes.
2 Income response error: a review of the literature
Income reporting in surveys is generally a two-stage process involving the reporting of
income sources in the ￿rst and of the corresponding amounts in the second (see Moore et
al., 2000). Errors can occur at either stage. An entire source of income can be omitted
(reported) even if it has (not) actually been received. Or, the source of income may be
reported correctly but the amount received for that source can be misreported.
A theoretical framework for the cognitive factors in reporting is proposed by Tourangeau
et al. (1984), who distinguish three stages in the cognitive process required to answer a
survey question: understanding, retrieval and response production.
In either of these stages there are areas of potential error. One reason for this is the
understanding of terms. Tourangeau et al. (2000) identify seven major types of comprehen-
sion problems: grammatical ambiguity, excessive complexity, faulty presuppositions, vague
concepts, vague quanti￿ers, unfamiliar terms and false inferences. For instance, for ques-
tions relating to non-cash bene￿ts it is not always possible to include in the questionnaire
a fully exhaustive list of examples to help the respondent. Therefore, it may not be clear
to him or her which items to include.
A second reason has to do with retrieval problems, that is the failure to bring to mind
information stored in long term memory (Groves et al., 2004). Even if the respondents have
fully understood the question, they may fail to retrieve the correct information. Lack of
knowledge is the primary cause. For instance, in the SHIW the respondent is often asked
to report the income sources earned by all the household members. Even if the respondent
is selected as the most knowledgeable person in the household, he or she may not know
detailed income proceedings of the other components (i.e. in the case of a working son still
living with his parents). Recall problems often arise as a result of the presence of multiple
jobs and/or of the low level of some incomes, e.g. in case of temporary jobs or small forms
of ￿nancial assistance. As a matter of fact, classical interference and information-processing
7theories suggest that as the number of similar or related events occurring to an individual
increases, the probability of recalling any one of those events declines (Groves et al., 2004).
Moreover, when the required information is not directly retrievable from their memory,
respondents adopt a reconstruction strategy which is unlikely to be completely successful.
For instance, it can lead to a sort of rounding (Pudney, 2008).
In the ￿nal stage, after recalling the requested information, the respondent adopts a re-
sponse strategy. Deliberate underreporting is probably the major cause of response error at
this stage. Nonetheless, besides deliberate prevarication, there are further possible sources
of error. Questions on household income may be considered impolite or very personal, mak-
ing the respondent more reticent. Another source of error may come from the interaction
between the interviewer and the respondent. For instance, if the respondent belongs to a
very rich household he or she may decide to underreport their income because of a desire
for ￿social conformability￿with the interviewer, or because of a fear of being robbed. This
could be considered as a special case of the so-called ￿social desirability bias￿ (Bagozzi,
1994), namely, the tendency for individuals to present themselves in a way that makes
them look positive in respect of cultural norms or standards. On the ￿ ip side, response
error and overreporting in particular, may arise from the respondent wanting to impress
the interviewer. Other studies show that the ￿social presence￿of the interviewer stimulates
the respondents to consider social norms at the judgment phase of their response, leading
to response errors (Turner et al., 1998). Interviewers also play a motivational role, setting
expectations for respondent performance (Groves et al., 2004; Fowler and Mangione, 1990).
The higher the interviewer￿ s concern about accuracy and their request for ￿precise answers￿
rather than ￿general ideas￿ , the higher the quality of the data provided by the respondents.
Indeed, the practice of matching interviewers and respondents on demographic traits is also
widespread in surveys, especially in the case of sensitive questions.
Response error is also a⁄ected by the data collection method. For instance, according
to the existing literature, computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) should reduce
errors (Couper et al., 1998). On the ￿ ip side, the respondent might not feel at ease if a
computer is used during the interview.
83 The adjustment procedure for response bias
There is an extensive literature on models dealing with response or measurement error. We
can separate the di⁄erent approaches to response errors into two broad categories, according
to whether or not identi￿cation is achieved with external information. In the absence of
external information, identi￿cation can be achieved in some particular cases (see for instance
Schennach, Hu and Lewbel, 2007; Bollinger, 1996; Imbens and Manski, 2004).
When external information is available, several possibilities arise. For instance, identi-
￿cation can be achieved with repeated observations of a variable within the same survey
(Kan and Pudney, 2008) or using panel data (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). The most
common approach consists of matching survey and administrative data. Matching is done
by either asking respondents for their relevant identi￿cation number directly, or using sta-
tistical matching based on personal data such as name, location and date of birth (see,
among others Bollinger and David, 2005; Pedace and Bates, 2001).
Our method lies in between those two approaches. As we lack respondents￿personal
identi￿ers we cannot perform any exact linkage with administrative data. Nonetheless, we
have collected several external data on earners and on income earned that can be used for
validating income survey data. Namely, our identi￿cation strategy rests on a sequence of
statistical exercises devised according to the kind of external information available. In each
step of the adjustment, we use the adjusted data from the previous steps. We also perform
a robustness check to assess whether the ordering of the adjustment steps a⁄ects the results
(see infra section 4).
3.1 Adjustment for unit nonresponse
In the ￿rst step of the adjustment we separate the e⁄ect of response error from the e⁄ect of
non-participation (unit nonresponse). Here we propose a new set of weights which exploits
recently available external information drawn from the EU-SILC (European Union Statistics
on Income and Living Conditions) survey. For Italy and starting from the 2004 wave, EU-
SILC survey data are linked with tax and administrative records containing information on
self-employment income, on wages and salaries and on public pensions. Survey data are
9then adjusted both on recipients and on amounts. When survey respondents fail to report
a source of income, it is imputed using administrative records. Moreover, income is set to
the maximum value between the net income resulting from the administrative record and
the net income reported in the survey (Consolini et al., 2006; Istat, 2009).
We use the adjusted information on income recipients to build a new set of weights
for SHIW survey modifying the actual ￿nal raking step (for a description see Faiella and
Gambacorta, 2007). Present raking forces weights to conform to marginal distributions
with respect to gender, age (4 classes), geographical area (3 classes) and municipality size
(4 classes). We modify this scheme including, as a further constraint, the distribution of
individuals according to their main source of income: wages and salaries, self-employment
income, pensions, capital income, ￿nancial assistance.4
The proposed new weighting scheme aligns the two populations along a pivotal variable
(main source of income), which is related to respondents￿income. Due to the new weighting
scheme the percentage of recipients increases for any source of income, at the expense of the
percentage of non-earners (table 4). This is because wealthier households tend to have a
lower propensity to participate in the survey (D￿ Alessio and Faiella, 2002), as corroborated
by the fact that the new weight is related positively to education and negatively to house-
hold size. For income from self-employment and from property the increase is respectively
equal to 3.4 and 5.6 percentage points. The increase in the coe¢ cients of variation is not
signi￿cant.
The new weights will be used in all the steps of the adjustment procedure. This will
enable us to separate the e⁄ect of response error from the e⁄ect of non-participation if the
following assumptions hold: ￿rst, the two sources of error are independent; second, unit
non-response is correctly accounted for by the new weighting scheme.
4This requires that all incomes are available at the individual level. In the EU-SILC survey, only income
from ￿nancial assets is collected at the household level, while in the SHIW also income from real investments
is available at the household level. In order to make data comparable, the latter revenues are attributed to
the members of the household using the following assignment rules: in both surveys, income from ￿nancial
assets is equally redistributed among earners; in the SHIW, income from non-￿nancial assets has been divided
among owners using available information on shares owned by each member.
103.2 Misreporting on secondary sources of income
In order to adjust income data from secondary jobs we develop a statistical matching exercise
which again exploits the Italian section of EU-SILC as an external source of information.
Due to the record linkage with administrative and tax records, we can assume that the
number of income recipients is correctly estimated in EU-SILC and perform a statistical
matching.
Using the new set of weights, we apply the following procedure. Let Iit be an indicator
equal to 1 if the respondent i has reported the secondary source of income t (Iit = 1) and
0 otherwise. Let I￿
it be the true latent respondent￿ s status. We assume that whenever a
respondent reports a source of income, his or her answer is ￿correct￿ . Overreporting is
unlikely since it increases respondents￿burden signi￿cantly: as a matter of fact, for each
income source a thorough set of information must be provided.
On the contrary, Iit = 0 is a mix of ￿correct￿answers and response error. Namely:
Pr(Iit = 0jX) = Pr(I￿
it = 0jX)￿t0(X) + [1 ￿ Pr(I￿
it = 0jX)][1 ￿ ￿t0(X)]
where ￿t0(X) is the (mixing) probability of correct reporting conditional on respondents￿
characteristics. This probability is unknown for the SHIW, but can be estimated through
EU-SILC using a matrix of individual characteristics X, also available in the SHIW (gen-
der, age, number of household members, educational attainment, geographical area and
main source of income). It can then be extrapolated to SHIW respondents. Once a ￿tted
probability b ￿t0(X) is obtained for each respondent in the SHIW, a random experiment is
used to impute secondary sources of income. The expected value of the random variable
is set equal to the di⁄erence between the percentages of recipients calculated from the two
surveys. This ensures that in the end the expected number of recipients is aligned.
Two underlying assumptions are needed. Firstly, the two surveys must be representative
of the same population: as a matter of fact, the marginal distributions of the condition-
ing variables are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent (also because of post-strati￿cation). Secondly,
conditional on common variables, the streams of income from the two surveys must be
independent, as commonly assumed in statistical matching.
11In particular, we estimate the following models:
￿ for respondents whose main source of income is payroll, we estimate their probability
of having a secondary source from either self-employment or pensions or other forms
of assistance (table 5);
￿ for respondents whose main source of income derives from self-employment we estimate
their probability of perceiving also pensions (table 5);
￿ for those whose main source of income is either pensions or capital we estimate the
probability of also having a payroll or self-employment income (table 6).
Table 7 summarizes the percentages of recipients by income source before and after the
adjustment process. The share of self-employment and payroll income earners increases by
3.9 and 2.6 percentage points respectively. The extent of the adjustment increases with
the respondent￿ s education and decreases with household size. Moreover, it is higher for
the Central and the Northern regions. It appears, therefore, to be positively related to the
respondents￿economic status.
Finally, income from these ￿tted secondary jobs are assigned with a random selection
of income ￿gures from the EU-SILC data (strati￿ed according to gender and geographical
area). Only secondary sources of income are used. In the case of payroll income and
pensions, this imputation lowers the mean values (table 8): this is because income perceived
in secondary dependent jobs is generally lower than in the principal ones. The opposite holds
for self-employment income, whose average value increases after the imputation.
3.3 Income from self-employment
As a second step, we deal with the misreporting behaviour of the self-employed as regards
their main source of income. The adjustment procedure exploits the relation between market
value of the main residence and income from work, hence modifying the traditional approach
developed by Pissarides and Weber (1989), based on the relation between food expenditure
and income. This relation is estimated on a validation sample and then extrapolated onto
the self-employed, under the assumption that the value of the main residence is correctly
12reported by all income groups while income reporting is accurate only in the validation
sample. Previous research shows that house prices collected in the SHIW are quite in line
with those from external sources (Cannari and Faiella, 2007). The adjustment allows for
both overreporting and underreporting.
Our validation sample (346 observations) includes employees working in the public sector
whose responses are deemed highly reliable by the interviewers. At the end of the interview
the interviewer is in fact asked to evaluate the respondent￿ s reliability in income reporting
and his ability to understand income questions, as well as to rate the overall climate of the
interview. For the validation sample we selected respondents with the maximum score (10)
in these three items.







= ￿ + X0￿
in which the dependent variable is the ratio of individual income from labour Y to market
value of main residence W. We prefer a relation at the individual rather than at the
household level ￿rstly because some of the right-hand side variables are individual (e.g.
age, labour income class). Secondly, because in this way we can avoid deciding whether
households composed of both self-employed and public sector employees must be included
or not in the validation sample; that decision would have involved looking at the magnitudes
of each income source, being in turn heavily in￿ uenced by the misreporting behaviour itself.
X contains three dummy variables indicating the labour income quartile the respondent
belongs to, the size of the house, a dummy variable for luxury dwellings and one indicating
whether the dwelling has been (totally or partially) received as a bequest or gift. Last, we
include other control variables, such as age, geographical area, size of the municipality, the
educational attainment of the interviewer. We also tried to account for mixed households
by including dummy variables for the presence of a self-employed or for the existence of
other sources of income, but no explicative power was added to the previous speci￿cation.
To make the two groups more similar to each other, we create a new set of weights
aligning the distribution of the validation sample with the estimated distribution of the
13self-employed by geographical area (3 classes) and household income (5 classes). This
auxiliary information is obtained from the SHIW data using the method by D￿ Alessio and
Faiella (2002) to adjust for nonresponse.
As expected, the income-to-house-value ratio increases in the upper income brackets,
while it decreases in the North, for larger and valuables dwellings (table 9). Estimated
coe¢ cients are then ￿tted to the self-employed in order to predict their expected income
from work given the value of their house and their characteristics. Moreover, a random
component from the distribution of the residuals is added to preserve the observed variabil-
ity.
Income from self-employment rises on average by around 36 per cent due to the ad-
justment, 11 percentage points more than found in Cannari and Violi (1995), who applied
the standard Pissarides and Weber approach to Italy.5 The adjustment is higher for large
households, for people living in the South and in the Centre, for women, for the youngsters
or for those with a low level of education (table 10).
3.4 Net income from ￿nancial assets and liabilities and property income
Income from ￿nancial assets is not directly collected in the SHIW, but computed applying
di⁄erent rates of return to corresponding categories of assets. Therefore our adjustment
relates to household ￿nancial wealth and is based on the approach developed by D￿ Aurizio
et al. (2006). They dealt with the issue of underreporting of ￿nancial assets and liabilities
using a survey conducted in 2003 by a leading Italian banking group on its customers as
a supplementary source of information. Each respondent answered questions on ￿nancial
assets held at the bank; then, survey data were linked to the bank databases using an exact
matching procedure, hence allowing a comparison between self-reported wealth and that
resulting from administrative records.6
This correction allows for both over- and underreporting. As a matter of fact, the
increasing complexity of households￿￿nancial portfolios makes the respondents￿task di¢ -
5As a robustness check, we have also replicated the standard method with our data and obtained an
upward revision by about 30 per cent.
6See the appendix for details on the methodology.
14cult. Some respondents may confuse di⁄erent ￿nancial instruments, thus providing ￿false
positive￿answers. Moreover, overreporting does not increase a respondent￿ s burden signif-
icantly, since the only information asked is the asset value.
The average adjusted value is about 3 times the unadjusted one. The correction is
higher for young respondents, the low educated and for those living in the South (table 11).
The adjustment is not therefore positively related to the respondents￿economic status. The
adjustment procedure also has an impact on interest paid on ￿nancial liabilities, though to
a smaller extent (table 12).
Regarding property income, previous studies, in particular Cannari and D￿ Alessio (1990,
2008), show that while the survey estimate of the number of total dwellings used as a
principal residence is in line with the macro ￿gure, this is not the case for other dwellings.
The method we borrow from Cannari and D￿ Alessio (1990) to adjust income from rents
relies on the assumption that the empirical distribution of the number of dwellings not used
as a principal residence recorded in the SHIW is a discrete Poisson distribution conditional
on a set of characteristics. In the absence of more precise information, all dwellings not
used as a principal residence are assumed equally likely to be declared by the owners. The
probability that one of these dwellings is declared in the SHIW can then be described by a
binomial distribution. This distribution can be estimated and used to impute ownership of
the missing dwellings, that is the di⁄erence between the number of dwellings owned by the
households (excluding the main residence) recorded in the SHIW and the corresponding
￿true￿ ￿gure derived from the Census.7 As for secondary job positions, the adjustment
process does not allow for overreporting, that is held unlikely because it increases response
burden signi￿cantly: in fact, respondents know that for each dwelling they report, they will
be asked a further set of detailed questions.
On average, the percentage of owners increases by 2.4 percentage points. The average
amount they hold increases by 11 per cent. There are no clear trends regarding the extent
of the adjustment: corrections are higher for men, for those older than 64 years and for
graduates (table 13).
7The value for 2004 has been computed by in￿ ating the ￿gure for 2001 (the year of the latest available
Census) with the net growth of the number of dwellings (see for details Banca d￿ Italia, 2008).
154 Results of the adjustment procedure
We ￿rst assess by how much the adjusted SHIW provides income aggregates which are
closer to those estimated in the national accounts. The correction steps performed so far
lead to an overall alignment of micro and macro ￿gures (table 1). Major improvements
are achieved for self-employment income and for entrepreneurial income and income from
￿nancial assets. Regarding the former, the SHIW now accounts for 88 per cent of the
corresponding national account aggregate; it was 43 per cent before. Original SHIW data
on income from ￿nancial wealth and from entrepreneurial activity accounted for only 13
per cent of the corresponding macro ￿gure; corrected data represent 72 per cent of the
same aggregate. Wages and salaries also bene￿t from the adjustment procedure, though to
a smaller extent: originally 88 per cent of the corresponding national accounts￿estimate
in 2004, they now stand at 94 per cent. Pensions and ￿nancial assistance are much less
a⁄ected, though a slight gain is also obtained for this source of income.
With regard to the income distribution, non-parametric estimates performed before and
after the adjustment show that modi￿cations of the shape of the distribution vary according
to the income type (￿gure 1). As a whole, the ￿ex-post￿distributions are slightly more
dispersed than the ￿ex-ante￿ , with higher probability mass at higher income levels; this
is particularly apparent for actual rents, for income from self-employment and for income
from ￿nancial assets.
With reference to inequality, we look at two standard measures - the interdecile ratio
and the Gini index - applied to disposable income and separately to each income source.
These measures are calculated only on individuals with a given income source; hence, any
variation after the adjustment can be due either to the inclusion of an entire income source
originally omitted or to the correction of a misreported amount.8 Total earnings, as well
as most income sources, turn out to be less equally distributed after the adjustment; for
income from ￿nancial assets only we obtain opposing indications from the two indices (table
14). Inequality rises considerably for income from independent work, due to the fact that we
8The ￿gures relating to unadjusted income may di⁄er from those in Banca d￿ Italia (2008) since we use a
di⁄erent method for computing capital income from ￿nancial assets (see Section 3.4).
16add many recipients of this income source as a secondary activity and revalue signi￿cantly
underreported amounts through the ￿modi￿ed￿ Pissarides and Weber (1989) procedure.
Payroll income and pensions and ￿nancial assistance are now slightly more unequally dis-
tributed, as we impute many small incomes of this kind from secondary positions. For actual
and imputed rents inequality rises, as expected, as non-reported dwellings are imputed on
the basis of the probability distribution of declared houses. Overall, the distribution of
disposable income widens: the decile ratio rises from 6.8 to 7.9 while the Gini index rises
from 0.385 to 0.427. A similar trend occurs when equivalent income, computed using the
OECD modi￿ed equivalence scale, is considered.
Finally, to test whether the results are a⁄ected by the ordering of the adjustment steps,
we ￿t our procedure with two alternative procedures: in the ￿rst one (alternative 1) we
change the order of the steps, in particular by shifting at the end the correction for self-
employment income; in the second the order is left as in the baseline case, but adjusted values
from previous steps are not considered (alternative 2). The results show that di⁄erences
are negligible (table 15).
4.1 Who are the misreporters?
As a result of the adjustment procedure each individual is characterized by a set of 14 proxy
indicators of misreporting regarding all their income sources. These indicators can help to
assess respondents￿misreporting behaviour in terms of both propensity and magnitude and
to describe the salient characteristics of the misreporters through the framework of the item
response theory. As many of these characteristics are not strictly exogenous to the event of
misreporting (above all, the occupational choice) we do not give a causal interpretation to
the results of these estimations; rather, we use them for descriptive purposes.
We consider two models. The ￿rst is the random intercept logistic model that is akin to
the Rasch model (Rasch, 1960). This model speci￿es the probability of a correct response
to item t (Yt = 1) conditional on the unobserved ￿ability￿of subject i (￿i)
Pr(Yit = 1j￿i) =
1
1 + e[￿(￿i￿￿t)]:
17The coe¢ cient ￿t is basically the proportion of errors relating to item t. Therefore, the
greater the ￿t, the more di¢ cult the item. In our model we include a dummy indicator
for each item to account for its level of di¢ culty. If a subject￿ s trait level ￿i exceeds the
di¢ culty of the item ￿t, then the probability of a correct response is greater than 0:5. Since
in our application we model the probability of an ￿incorrect answer￿ , signs are reversed and
￿t can be interpreted as the easiness of the item. Thus, given the respondent￿ s latent trait,
the easier the item the lower the probability of an ￿incorrect￿answer.
In practice we estimate the model
logit[Pr(Yit = 1jX;￿i)] = ￿ + X0￿
where Yit is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the i ￿ th respondent is estimated to
misreport on item t (t = 1;::;14).
We construct the following 14 response dummy variables Yit relating di⁄erent sources
of income:
Items
Yi1 = Additional payroll income Yi8 = Income from shares
Yi2 = Additional self-empl. income Yi9 = Income from mutual funds
Yi3 = Primary self-empl. income Yi10 = Income from managed savings
Yi4 = Additional income from pensions Yi11 = Interests on ￿nancial liabilites
Yi5 = Income from deposits Yi12 = Income from actual rents
Yi6 = Income from government bonds Yi13 = Income from imputed rents
Yi7 = Income from private bonds Yi14 = Income from ￿nancial assistance
The second model exploits the information on the estimated amount of response error.
Once a given answer to item t is marked as ￿incorrect￿ , not only do we impute the ownership
of that source of income, but also its expected value. It is therefore possible to end up with
a distribution of misreported amounts for each item. This enables us to classify the response
errors into four categories, according to the quartile of the estimated misreported amount
on item t they belong to. We specify the following random-intercept proportional odds
model:
logit[Pr(Yit > sjX;￿i)] = ￿ + X0￿
18where S are the ordinal categories with index s (s = 1;2;3;4); based on the quartiles of
the distribution of response error.
One important caveat is that we cannot assess whether the respondent has reported the
￿true￿value of a given income source. We are only able to estimate the probability of their
providing a wrong answer. The ￿nal set of outcome variables we construct are therefore
proxies of response error. Each outcome can be written as Yit = Y ￿
it + eit where Y ￿
it is the
true latent outcome and eit is the error we may add because of the adjustment process. Our
results are unbiased only if the following conditions hold:
1. the error term eit and the observable characteristics used in the adjustment are not
correlated, namely E(eitjX) = 0: This assumption does not appear to be very restric-
tive. It implies that all the adjustments do not produce biased results for a given
set of characteristics. Indeed, this should not be the case in our application since we
employ several independent sources of validation data and it is unlikely that all of
them produce biased estimates of the same coe¢ cients;
2. eit is not correlated with some unobservable characteristics which are not used in the
adjustment process. Unfortunately this assumption cannot be made with certainty.
Nevertheless, the measures of goodness of ￿t of our models are satisfactory in most
cases.
Turning to the covariates used in the analysis, we ￿rst include a set of indicator variables,
one for each income item. Their coe¢ cients can be interpreted as the ￿item di¢ culties￿ ,
re￿ ecting the proportion of individuals who are estimated to provide an incorrect answer
to a given item. A second group of regressors includes a set of classical controls: age and
its square, education, occupational status, area of residence, household wealth. Finally
we includes variables accounting for the data collection process referred to in Section 2.
In particular, we include two dummies for proxy respondents and one dummy for the use
of the CAPI method. Moreover, we include a variable representing the interviewer￿ s as-
sessment of the respondent￿ s level of understanding of the questions (on a scale of 1 to
10; comprehension) in order to proxy for respondents￿cognitive ability. Finally, we in-
clude three dummy variables indicating whether the interviewer and the respondent match
19in terms of gender, education and age. Namely, the variable edu ￿ inter takes value 1 if
one person between the interviewer and the respondent holds at least an upper secondary
school diploma, while the other has at most a lower secondary school certi￿cate. The vari-
able age ￿ inter takes value 1 when the di⁄erence in age is greater than ten years. These
variables are meant to capture unobserved interactions between interviewer and respondent
which are likely to happen during the interview in￿ uencing a respondent￿ s attitude towards
response error.
Tables 16 and 17 summarize the results. As to the item di¢ culty parameters in table 16,
the higher their value, the higher the percentage of response errors. The overall picture is
consistent with the preliminary analysis presented in the Introduction. The items relating
to ￿nancial wealth components show higher percentages of response errors. One possible
explanation for this is the increasing complexity of household ￿nancial portfolios, resulting
in a higher cost of information retrieval for respondents. Income from ￿nancial assistance
has the lowest misreported percentage, mainly because they only refer to a marginal share
of the population.
Respondents￿characteristics show a similar association with response error when consid-
ering either income sources or corresponding amounts. Misreporting is more likely among
male respondents and among those living in the North. It also increases with age, probably
because of the greater di¢ culties older people face to retrieve the necessary information
to reply. It also increase with the level of educational attainment. This result is proba-
bly driven by the adjustment process we use for secondary dwellings (see Section 3.4). As
expected those who are self-employed show higher response errors than employees. Not
only, as con￿rmed by previous research, independent workers are likely to have a higher
propensity towards underreporting, but their income has a higher variability and therefore
implies greater recall di¢ culties. Finally, greater errors are to be expected among more
a› uent households. That result is in line with prior expectations, not least because those
households have a higher number of items to report on during the interview. It is therefore
likely that some errors may occur at some stage.
It is worth stressing that the results of the models are strongly driven by the results
of the adjustment procedure described in Section 3. In a sense, these models can be seen
20as tools that summarize and show the ￿nal results of the adjustment process. The within-
subject correlation among the outcomes of the 14 items is a⁄ected by the sign and the
magnitudes of the observable characteristics used in the analysis. For instance, if for each
adjustment a positive association between self-employment and response error is found, this
will result in a higher probability of ￿nding ￿incorrect responses￿along all the 14 items.
The use of the CAPI data collection technique reduces the chance of response error
with respect to the paper-and-pencil interviewing (PAPI) method. On the contrary, the
probability of misreporting increases in the case of proxy respondents or when respondents￿
cognitive ability of understanding questions are judged unsatisfactory by the interviewer.
Finally, all proxies for the existence of signi￿cant demographic di⁄erences between re-
spondent and interviewer suggest that those di⁄erences increase the probability of response
errors. As anticipated in Section 2, the respondent might feel more at ease with an inter-
viewer whose social status more closely mirrors their own and the resulting climate might
be more con￿dential; overreporting arising from the respondent wanting to make a positive
impress on the interviewer will be then less likely. On the contrary, wealthy respondents
might be tempted to underreport their income in the presence of an interviewer coming
from a lower social class. Similar mechanisms may be at work when there are sizeable age
di⁄erences or when they are of opposite gender.
Table 18 shows the distribution of respondents according to their expected number of
reporting errors along the 14 items. Each respondent is classi￿ed as a ￿misreporter￿ in
a given item if his or her estimated probability exceeds the average probability computed
for that same item. These indicators of misreporting behaviour are then summed at the
respondents￿level to provide a synthetic indicator of their behaviour.
Our ￿ndings suggest that respondents can be grouped into three clusters on the basis of
their latent trait ￿i. Some 27 per cent of them can be deemed highly reliable, their expected
probability of misreporting being close to zero. At the opposite side of the distribution,
about 15 per cent of respondents are likely to misreport on at least four items.
The average amount of response error is estimated to be about e 4,000 per year (table
19). The distribution looks highly concentrated with a Gini index of 0.799. Around 10 per
cent of respondents are estimated to have an average response error of about e 46,000 and
21they are responsible for two thirds of total misreporting.
Robustness checks involving the use of synthetic indicators - the number of misreported
items and the average value of the adjustment - and the estimation of several speci￿cations
provide a consistent picture.9
5 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate misreporting behaviour in survey data on personal income.
Data from the Bank of Italy￿ s 2004 SHIW have been checked against external sources in
order to assess if, and to what extent, information provided by respondents was correctly
reported. Our main results may be summarized as follows.
First, we estimate response error to be on average e4,000 per year, about 12 per cent
of reported household income. Underreporting issues emerged as particularly serious with
regard to income from ￿nancial assets and from self-employment: respectively the bias is
estimated to be as much as 3 and 1.4 times the reported amounts.
Second, we found that the estimated response error has a signi￿cant in￿ uence on income
distribution. The Gini index increases for most of the income sources, but not for income
from ￿nancial assets. The inequality level of total disposable income distribution is higher
for adjusted than for unadjusted data.
Third, our ￿ndings suggest that respondents are predisposed to provide either accurate
answers or poor data; around 15 per cent of respondents are likely to be highly unreliable.
Moreover, the distribution of the magnitude of response error is highly concentrated. Some
10 per cent of respondents are estimated to account for two thirds of the total amount of
response error.
These results are useful on two levels. First, they allow the researchers who use SHIW
micro-data to take data quality fully into account when conducting their studies. Second,
our results may help data producers to improve data quality, since similar surveys are
likely to be a⁄ected, at least partly, by the same issues. Surveys are generally designed
to minimize sampling error. In the SHIW the relative standard error of average household
9Estimates, not reported for the sake of brevity, are available upon request.
22income is about 1.2 per cent, ten times lower compared with the estimated response error.
Improvements in sample design are therefore needed to reduce such error. Our results show
that one important source of error comes from the interaction between respondents and
interviewers. The more similar they are, the lower the response error. Realistically, this
does not imply that interviewers should be selected on the basis of similarity to respondents,
however, more resources could be allocated in their training, stressing the importance of
their behaviour/attitude when interviewing a respondent very di⁄erent from themselves.
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267 Methodological appendix
7.1 Income and jobs: a comparison between the SHIW and the NA
In order to assess the degree of accuracy of microeconomic data on income collected by
the SHIW we compare them with corresponding macro ￿gures from the National Accounts.
We only consider the year 2004; comparisons referred to previous years can be found in
Brandolini (1999), in Coromaldi and Guerrera (2006) and in Cannari and D￿ Alessio (2008).
The two sources have been matched according to the following criteria. Payroll income
includes net wages and salaries and fringe bene￿ts. Pensions and net transfers include
pensions, arrears and wage supplementation. The item ￿Income from self-employment in
economic producing units with 5 dependents or less and actual rents￿ compares with the
Italian NA item ￿Mixed income share transferred from productive to consumer households￿
not featuring in the ESA95 framework, where income from activity in producing house-
holds (unincorporated enterprises) is classi￿ed. The item ￿Income from self-employment
in economic producing units with more than 5 dependents￿ compares with the NA item
￿Withdrawals from income of quasi-corporations￿. The item ￿Imputed rents￿ is contrasted
with the NA item ￿Gross operating surplus￿ since it is essentially (by more than 80 per
cent; Agostinelli, 2003) represented by imputed rents from owner-occupied dwellings, with
the residual part being domestic services, agricultural production for own use and mainte-
nance made by the owner. The item ￿Entrepreneurial income and income from ￿nancial
assets￿ includes three NA items, ￿Dividends￿ ￿Other distributed income of corporations￿ (not
featuring in the ESA95 manual) and ￿Net interest￿. Social contributions paid by dependent
and independent workers have been subtracted from aggregates in the NA. Taxes on income
have been assigned pro quota to the di⁄erent income categories excluding imputed rents (as
in Brandolini, 1999). Depreciation is taken into account for the items ￿Income from self-
employment in economic producing units with 5 dependents or less and actual rents￿ and
for ￿Imputed rents￿. Further details on NA de￿nitions can be found in Agostinelli (2003)
and in Agostinelli and Di Veroli (2003).
A number of caveats must be introduced as the comparison, while necessary, is inher-
ently limited in scope: the reference population is di⁄erent in the two sources (residents
net of institutionalized persons in the SHIW versus residents and non-residents in the NA);
the SHIW su⁄ers from the typical problems of sample surveys on households (lack of rep-
resentativeness of some categories of income recipients, reticence, missing responses that
were not randomly distributed); NA aggregates are subject to frequent revisions as new
information becomes available, and include explicit adjustments to cope with undeclared
work, which is likely to be only partly captured by the survey; income de￿nitions some-
times do not match perfectly in the two sources. On this point, the SHIW asks for data on
income net of taxes and social contributions, while the NA are built on a gross basis. The
assignment of taxes and social contributions to each separate income category in the NA
is an unavoidable source of measurement error. For all these reasons, although the NA are
the best available benchmark, it is worth stressing that our adjustment procedure does not
aim at aligning microdata to them exactly.
Table 1 shows that in 2004 the micro estimates of payroll income and of income from
pensions and net transfers were lower than the corresponding macro ￿gures by 12 and 31
27per cent, respectively. In addition, the SHIW estimate of income from self-employment was
about 43 per cent of the corresponding macro ￿gure, mainly because of income generated
in the largest units (29 per cent). Entrepreneurial income and income from ￿nancial assets
fared even worse (13 per cent of the corresponding NA aggregate). By contrast, we de-
tected a sizeable overestimation of the imputed rents, presumably re￿ ecting the estimation
procedure that Istat adopts to meet speci￿c requirements of the ESA95 (Istat, 2004). In
particular, imputed rents are estimated not by relying on subjective evaluations collected
through the Survey on Consumption Expenditure (which provides an estimate of the im-
puted rents that is broadly comparable with the SHIW estimate), but using the value of
actual rents for similar dwellings.
7.2 The adjustment procedure for ￿nancial assets: methodological details
In order to improve upon data comparability, the design and implementation of the survey
conducted by the banking group were planned to be as similar as possible to those of the
SHIW. The reference population was made up of customers who authorized the disclosure of
their data for research purposes, as required under Italian law. The population was strati￿ed
according to its geographical area of residence, municipality size and, most importantly,
to the ￿nancial wealth held in the bank. The survey collected data on 1,834 households.
Assuming that respondents were representative of customers of other banks, this information
can be extrapolated to the SHIW data. In order to strengthen that assumption the sampling
weights were post-strati￿ed to reproduce the distribution of the Italian population of banks￿
customers (e.g. geographical area).
The econometric framework is based on the hurdle models (Wooldridge, 2003). The
￿rst step estimates the non-reporting of ownership: the response variable, obtained from
the administrative records, is a dummy for the actual holding of an asset. The probability of
non-reporting is estimated by including among the covariates a dummy for the declared asset
ownership in the interview. The analysis is carried out separately for six ￿nancial assets
(deposits and repos, government bonds, private bonds, quoted shares, mutual funds and
managed savings) and for ￿nancial liabilities. The second step models the underreporting
of the amount held, de￿ned as the ratio between the actual and the reported amount for
each class of assets. This ratio is computed at the individual level and is assumed to be a
proxy for reticence at the household level. The log of the ratio is regressed on the household
declared amount, its square, and a set of sociodemographic characteristics. The third step
￿ts the preceding estimates to the SHIW data. For each ￿nancial instrument, the estimated
probability of holding a given asset is ￿tted at the household level. A random experiment is
then used to impute ownership to households which are likely to possess an asset, whether
they declare it or not. We reconstruct for every asset the amount owned by the households
to whom the experiment attributes ownership, even if they did not declare it. Finally, the
estimated coe¢ cients of misreporting on amounts are ￿tted to SHIW data to obtain an
in￿ ation factor (less often a de￿ ation factor) for the declared amount.
288 Tables and ￿gures
Table 1:National Accounts and SHIW income estimates
Source of income NA SHIW(1) SHIW(2) SHIW(1)/NA SHIW(2)/NA
Millions of euro Percentages
Payroll income 303;466 267;962 285;656 88:3 94:1
Imputed rents 57;278 125;733 164;575 219:5 287:3
Income from self-employment in units
with up to 5 employees and actual rents 167;406 79;440 162;689 47:5 97:2
with more than 5 employees 52;418 15;447 30;297 29:5 57:8
Entrepren. income, income from ￿nanc. assets 111;877 14;951 80;553 13:4 72:0
Pensions and net transfers 222;754 153;969 158;831 69:1 71:3
NA SHIW(1) SHIW(2) SHIW(1)-NA SHIW(2)-NA
Share of total income (%) Percentage points
Payroll income 33:2 40:8 32:4 7:6 ￿0:8
Imputed rents 6:3 19:1 18:6 12:8 12:3
Income from self-employment in units
with up to 5 employees and actual rents 18:3 12:1 18:4 ￿6:2 0:1
with more than 5 employees 5:7 2:3 3:4 ￿3:4 ￿2:3
Entrepren. income, income from ￿nanc. assets 12:2 2:3 9:1 ￿9:9 ￿3:1
Pensions and net transfers 24:3 23:4 18:0 ￿0:9 ￿6:3
SHIW(1) = unadjusted ￿gures; SHIW(2) = adjusted ￿gures.
Table 2: Workers by main income source
Main source of income LFS* NA SHIW SHIW/LFS NA/LFS
From employment 16;117;254 18;029;080 16;115;090 100:0 89:4
From self-employment 6;287;176 6;226;750 6;008;486 95:6 96:5
Total 22;404;430 24;255;830 22;123;576 98:7 91:2
* Labour force survey (yearly average).
Table 3: Jobs held
NA SHIW SHIW/NA
Employees 20;055;000 16;633;430 82:9
Self-employed 10;976;300 6;292;250 57:3
Total 31;031;300 22;925;680 73:9
29Table 4: E⁄ect of the new weighting scheme
Recipients (%) Mean values ( e) Coe⁄. of variation
Source of income Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final
Payroll income 30:9 32:6 14;458 15;080 1:2% 1:2%
Income from self-employment 8:4 11:8 20;436 20;929 5:3% 4:1%
Pensions 24:3 25:6 10;417 10;825 1:1% 0:9%
Property income 65:0 70:6 4;283 3;993 2:4% 2:0%
Financial assistance 3:9 5:1 1;562 1;605 13:1% 13:5%
Table 5. Probability of a secondary source of income by main source
Main source Payroll income Self -empl.
Secondary source Self-empl. Pensions Financ. assistance Pensions
Geogr. area (base: South/ Islands) Coe⁄. St. err. Coe⁄. St. err. Coe⁄. St. err. Coe⁄. St. err.
North 0:018 0:001 ￿0:153 0:002 ￿0:118 0:002 0:317 0:002
Center 0:080 0:001 0:033 0:002 ￿0:306 0:002 0:145 0:003
Education (base: = degree)
None/primary ￿0:558 0:003 0:292 0:003 0:834 0:002 0:663 0:003
Secondary school ￿0:360 0:002 0:180 0:002 0:013 0:002 0:074 0:003
Age class (base: > 64)
< 25 ￿0:612 0:004 ￿1:998 0:007 ￿0:134 0:012 ￿2:484 0:020
25 - 44 ￿0:006 0:003 ￿1:183 0:003 1:071 0:011 ￿1:680 0:008
45 - 64 ￿0:112 0:003 0:515 0:003 0:704 0:011 0:711 0:007
Household size (base: > 4)
1 member 0:126 0:002 0:072 0:003 ￿0:334 0:003 0:300 0:004
2 members ￿0:095 0:002 0:439 0:002 0:135 0:002 0:508 0:003
3 members ￿0:085 0:002 0:164 0:002 ￿0:040 0:002 0:156 0:003
4 members 0:013 0:002 ￿0:545 0:003 0:199 0:002 ￿0:448 0:004
Gender
Male 0:158 0:001 0:052 0:001 ￿0:190 0:001 0:143 0:002
Intercept ￿2:395 0:003 ￿3:186 0:003 ￿4:044 0:011 ￿2:747 0:007
Observations 17;908 5;714
30Table 6. Probability of a secondary source of income by main source
Main source Pensions Capital income
Secondary source Payroll income Self-emp. inc. Payroll income Self-emp. inc.
Geogr. area (base: South/ Islands) Coef. St. err. Coef. St. err. Coef. St. err. Coef. St. err.
North ￿0:083 0:002 0:204 0:002 0:343 0:002 0:360 0:002
Center 0:205 0:002 0:091 0:002 0:147 0:002 0:206 0:002
Education (base: = degree)
None/primary ￿0:564 0:003 ￿0:745 0:002 ￿0:760 0:003 ￿0:524 0:002
Secondary school 0:110 0:002 ￿0:209 0:002 ￿0:019 0:002 ￿0:137 0:002
Age class (base: > 64)
< 25 0:266 0:007 ￿0:414 0:014 1:103 0:005 ￿0:055 0:005
25 - 44 0:685 0:005 ￿0:156 0:010 1:245 0:004 0:598 0:003
45 - 64 0:594 0:003 0:497 0:006 0:577 0:004 0:130 0:002
Household size (base: > 4)
1 member ￿0:202 0:004 ￿0:427 0:004 0:507 0:003 ￿0:031 0:003
2 members ￿0:263 0:003 0:010 0:003 0:003 0:003 0:058 0:003
3 members 0:069 0:003 0:329 0:003 ￿0:069 0:003 0:053 0:003
4 members 0:608 0:003 0:296 0:004 ￿0:174 0:003 0:071 0:003
Gender
Male 0:277 0:002 0:480 0:002 0:208 0:002 0:858 0:001
Intercept ￿2:552 0:004 ￿3:206 0:006 ￿2:417 0:004 ￿1:629 0:002
Observations 12;832 5;256
31Table 7: Income recipients by source (percentages)
Payroll Self-empl. Pensions Fin. assistance
Characteristics Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final
Gender
Male 38:4 41:5 15:3 19:8 23:9 25:4 5:7 5:9
Female 27:1 29:2 8:5 11:9 27:2 28:0 4:6 4:8
Age class
<25 14:8 15:6 2:9 4:3 0:5 0:5 4:5 4:5
25-44 61:4 63:1 20:0 25:3 1:5 1:8 6:4 7:0
45-64 39:3 43:9 17:9 22:8 27:9 32:1 5:8 6:0
>64 0:4 4:3 2:1 5:7 93:2 93:2 3:1 3:1
Education
None/primary school 6:9 9:0 3:5 5:5 47:7 48:4 3:8 3:9
Secondary school 44:9 47:7 14:8 19:6 14:5 15:8 5:6 5:9
University degree 53:0 56:1 26:8 31:9 13:1 14:6 7:4 7:9
Household size
1 member 29:8 33:3 14:3 20:1 53:7 54:7 10:7 10:7
2 members 29:5 33:1 9:9 14:7 49:1 50:7 5:0 5:4
3 members 37:1 40:2 13:2 17:3 19:0 20:4 5:0 5:2
4 members 34:9 36:3 12:4 15:4 7:6 8:3 3:6 4:0
5 or more members 26:8 28:1 8:6 10:7 7:9 8:7 3:3 3:5
Geographical area
North 37:3 40:2 13:1 17:2 26:2 27:6 4:8 5:1
Center 35:7 38:6 12:9 19:1 27:5 28:5 6:4 6:5
South and Islands 25:0 27:1 9:6 12:1 23:8 24:7 4:8 5:1
Total 32:6 35:2 11:8 15:7 25:6 26:8 5:1 5:4
32Table 8: Individual income by source (e )
Payroll Self-empl. Pensions Fin. assistance
Characteristics Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final
Gender
Male 15;648 15;007 23;530 23;352 12;523 11;813 561 2;323
Female 12;868 12;392 15;101 18;850 8;675 8;434 2;715 2;925
Age class
<25 9;160 8;885 8;408 16;011 4;082 4;082 1;997 2;020
25-44 14;370 14;221 20;855 20;488 6;120 5;233 1;660 2;582
45-64 16;563 15;504 20;876 26;280 11;708 10;238 1;259 3;102
>64 14;584 7;458 29;440 10;162 10;060 10;060 1;176 2;503
Education
None/primary school 11;549 10;281 14;290 21;889 8;663 8;550 1;988 2;586
Secondary school 13;806 13;392 18;524 23;021 12;582 11;546 1;639 2;456
University degree 20;670 19;984 32;504 14;320 20;731 18;525 68 3;536
Household size
1 member 16;688 15;540 26;133 19;650 10;300 10;115 ￿931 1;762
2 members 14;908 14;039 23;995 19;030 10;218 9;894 1;459 2;575
3 members 14;390 13;743 15;649 17;128 10;693 9;971 2;697 2;959
4 members 13;928 13;649 20;545 28;154 11;328 10;407 3;214 3;286
5 or more members 12;735 12;646 17;196 24;608 10;173 9;387 2;433 2;449
Geographical area
North 15;137 14;558 23;806 19;823 11;138 10;607 1;623 2;867
Center 15;523 14;958 20;113 27;550 11;000 10;601 717 2;134
South and Islands 12;360 11;813 14;796 19;742 9;053 8;742 2;091 2;597
Total 14;458 13;888 20;412 21;601 10;417 9;991 1;562 2;603
33Table 9: Labour income and market value of main residence
Dep. variable: ratio of labour income to market value of main residence
Coe⁄. P-value
Geogr. area (base: South and Islands)
North ￿0:050 0:00
Center 0:040 0:01
Municipality size (base: medium)
Small municipalities ￿0:048 0:58
Large municipalities 0:063 < :0001
Male ￿0:008 0:48
Education (base: secondary school)
Primary ￿0:066 0:25
Tertiary ￿0:006 0:86
Labour income quartile (base: First)
Second 0:037 0:32
Third 0:093 0:01
Fourth 0:182 < :0001




Luxury dwelling ￿0:072 < :0001
Logarithm of house surface ￿0:099 < :0001
Low-rate dwelling 0:125 0:07
Interviewer￿ s characteristics
free-lance 0:021 0:20
graduate ￿0:208 < :0001
main job as interviewer 0:017 0:25
Inheritance/gift ￿0:050 < :0001
Intercept 0:662 < :0001
Observations 346
Adj R-square 0:72
34Table 10: Adjustment of income from self-employment
Mean values Variation
Characteristics Initial Final %
Gender
Male 26;600 32;858 23:5
Female 17;770 30;201 70:0
Age class
<30 9;485 23;794 150:9
30-40 23;244 29;265 25:9
>50 25;880 36;872 42:5
Education
None/primary school 16;870 34;333 103:5
Secondary and tertiary school 24;132 31;650 31:2
Household size
1 member 30;950 32;445 4:8
2 members 28;848 29;887 3:6
3 members 18;340 26;112 42:4
> 3 members 21;710 36;366 67:5
Geographical area
North 28;069 28;754 2:4
Center 23;049 47;943 108:0
South and Islands 16;446 25;911 57:6
Total 23;438 31;907 36:1
35Table 11: Adjustment of income from ￿nancial assets
Percent. of owners Mean values (e )
Characteristics Initial Final Initial Final
Gender
Male 65:3 66:5 550 1;514
Female 52:5 53:4 472 1;577
Age class
<25 15:3 15:5 162 1;380
25-44 72:8 74:1 443 1;141
45-64 71:9 73:4 592 1;635
>64 74:3 75:6 618 2;098
Education
None/primary school 42:4 43:4 244 1;439
Secondary school 64:9 65:9 481 1;427
University degree 84:9 86:1 1;347 2;506
Household size
1 member 75:9 77:2 654 2;419
2 members 73:6 74:8 571 1;726
3 members 59:6 60:3 572 1;447
4 members 48:9 49:8 350 989
5 or more members 34 35:2 304 988
Geographical area
North 72 72:4 644 1;660
Center 64:1 65 484 1;760
South and Islands 39:1 41:1 239 1;098
Total 58:7 59:8 514 1;543
36Table 12: Adjustment of interest on ￿nancial liabilities
Percent. of owners Mean values (e )
Characteristics Initial Final Initial Final
Gender
Male 22:6 26:4 1;165 1;246
Female 15:1 18:2 1;104 1;239
Age class
<25 6:2 7:6 827 958
25-44 31:1 35:5 1;426 1;581
45-64 24:8 29:8 921 1;000
>64 6:8 9:7 466 531
Education
None/primary school 7:2 9:3 556 646
Secondary school 23:9 27:9 1;178 1;234
University degree 30:2 36 1;545 2;013
Household size
1 member 12:7 15:9 1;372 1;683
2 members 17:1 21:3 1;535 1;490
3 members 21:3 25:6 812 1;008
4 members 22:1 24:7 1;156 1;235
5 or more members 14:6 17:6 976 982
Geographical area
North 22:4 26 1;380 1;472
Center 18:9 24 936 1;104
South and Islands 13:9 16:4 799 894
Total 18:7 22:2 1;140 1;243
37Table 13: Adjustment of income from rents
Percent. of owners Mean values (e )
Characteristics Initial Final Initial Final
Gender
Male 47:8 50:3 6;131 6;904
Female 48:3 50:7 5;226 5;745
Age class
<25 4:5 5:1 5;676 5;309
25-44 45:8 49:2 5;326 5;979
45-64 72:5 75:9 5;926 6;549
>64 75:1 77:2 5;657 6;405
Education
None/primary school 45:8 47:3 4;227 4;751
Secondary school 47:8 50:6 5;976 6;552
University degree 60:9 64:6 8;690 10;027
Household size
1 member 75:9 77:6 6;959 7;693
2 members 63:9 67:9 5;537 6;309
3 members 46 48 5;302 6;007
4 members 35:2 37:6 5;381 5;812
5 or more members 23:4 24:6 4;366 4;660
Geographical area
North 50:3 53:4 6;480 7;220
Center 52:4 54:7 6;874 7;795
South and Islands 42:9 44:6 3;655 3;936
Total 48:1 50:5 5;663 6;305
Table 14. Interdecile ratio (IDR) and the Gini index
Source of income Unadjusted IDR Adjusted IDR Unadjusted Gini Adjusted Gini
Payroll income 3:49 4:40 0:262 0:291
Income from self-employment 9:50 39:75 0:493 0:564
Pensions and ￿nancial assistance 4:15 5:20 0:317 0:330
Actual rents 17:07 54:54 0:553 0:601
Imputed rents 7:75 9:17 0:418 0:471
Net income from ￿nancial assets 100:76 153:42 0:857 0:727
Disposable personal income 6:85 7:95 0:385 0:427
Equivalent income (OECD modi￿ed scale) 4:42 5:18 0:341 0:364
38Table 15. Results with alternative models of adjustment
Source of income Baseline* Alternative 1** Alternative 2***
Mean values (e, millions )
Payroll income 285;656 285;656 283;546
Imputed rents 164;575 165;021 165;073
Income from self-employment in units
with up to 5 employees and actual rents 162;689 163;217 158;404
with more than 5 employees 30;297 31;146 31;147
Entrepren. income and income from ￿nanc. assets 80;553 80;645 79;931
Pensions and net transfers 158;831 158;831 158;831
* Order as indicated in the paper. Adj. values at each step are used in the following steps.
** Income from self-empl. as the ￿nal step of the process. Adj. values at each step are used in the following steps.
*** Order as indicated in the paper. Adj. values at each step are not used in the following steps.
39Table 16. Probability of misreporting: random intercept logistic model
Variables Coef. P>jzj 95% Conf. Interval
Item
Additional payroll income ￿8:424 0:000 ￿8:690 ￿8:157
Additional self-empl. income ￿8:053 0:000 ￿8:315 ￿7:791
Primary self-empl. income ￿7:209 0:000 ￿7:464 ￿6:953
Additional income from pension ￿9:062 0:000 ￿9:341 ￿8:782
Income from deposits ￿3:715 0:000 ￿3:960 ￿3:471
Income from government bonds ￿6:976 0:000 ￿7:230 ￿6:722
Income from private bonds ￿5:882 0:000 ￿6:132 ￿5:632
Income from shares ￿6:575 0:000 ￿6:827 ￿6:323
Income from mutual funds ￿5:696 0:000 ￿5:946 ￿5:447
Income from managed savings ￿7:947 0:000 ￿8:208 ￿7:687
Interests on ￿nancial liabilities ￿5:753 0:000 ￿6:003 ￿5:503
Income from actual rents ￿7:558 0:000 ￿7:815 ￿7:301
Income from imputed rents ￿7:243 0:000 ￿7:498 ￿6:988
Income from ￿nancial assistance ￿10:617 0:000 ￿10:981 ￿10:252
Age 0:081 0:000 0:074 0:088
Age squared 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Educational quali￿cation (base: none)
Primary school certi￿cate 0:276 0:000 0:173 0:380
Lower secondary school certi￿cate 1:098 0:000 0:961 1:235
Upper secondary school diploma 1:381 0:000 1:241 1:521
University degree 1:503 0:000 1:354 1:652
Geographical area (base: North)
Center ￿0:215 0:000 ￿0:263 ￿0:168
South and Islands ￿0:956 0:000 ￿1:004 ￿0:907
Gender Female (base: male) ￿0:277 0:000 ￿0:317 ￿0:236
Work status (base: payroll employee)
Self-employed 0:567 0:000 0:498 0:636
Not employed ￿1:340 0:000 ￿1:399 ￿1:281
Quintiles of household wealth (base: 1st quintile)
2nd quintile 0:290 0:000 0:198 0:382
3rd quintile 0:339 0:000 0:261 0:417
4th quintile 0:394 0:000 0:331 0:457
5th quintile 0:603 0:000 0:544 0:663
Proxy respondent on payroll income 0:751 0:000 0:681 0:822
Proxy respondent on self-employment income 0:672 0:000 0:529 0:814
CAPI ￿0:081 0:000 ￿0:125 ￿0:038
Edu-inter 0:798 0:000 0:699 0:897
Sex-inter 0:323 0:000 0:279 0:366
Age-inter 0:201 0:000 0:152 0:251
Comprehension 0:077 0:000 0:064 0:089
Standard error. random intercept 0:5325
40Table 17. Probability of misreporting: random intercept ordinal logistic model
Variables Coef. P>jzj 95% Conf. Interval
Item
Additional payroll income 2:194 0:000 1:912 2:475
Additional self-empl. income 2:561 0:000 2:284 2:839
Primary self-empl. income 3:432 0:000 3:161 3:704
Additional income from pension 1:528 0:000 1:235 1:822
Income from deposits 6:421 0:000 6:154 6:689
Income from government bonds 3:653 0:000 3:382 3:923
Income from private bonds 4:714 0:000 4:445 4:982
Income from shares 4:031 0:000 3:761 4:301
Income from mutual funds 4:869 0:000 4:600 5:137
Income from managed savings 2:667 0:000 2:391 2:944
Interests on ￿nancial liabilities 4:839 0:000 4:571 5:107
Income from actual rents 3:066 0:000 2:793 3:340
Income from imputed rents 3:370 0:000 3:098 3:641
Age 0:072 0:000 0:066 0:079
Age squared 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Educational quali￿cation (base: none)
Primary school certi￿cate 0:286 0:000 0:190 0:381
Lower secondary school certi￿cate 1:058 0:000 0:931 1:185
Upper secondary school diploma 1:332 0:000 1:202 1:461
University degree 1:471 0:000 1:333 1:609
Geographical area (base: North)
Center ￿0:189 0:000 ￿0:233 ￿0:146
South and Islands ￿0:766 0:000 ￿0:811 ￿0:722
Gender Female (base: male) ￿0:259 0:000 ￿0:297 ￿0:222
Work status (base: payroll employee)
Self-employed 0:636 0:000 0:573 0:698
Not employed ￿1:172 0:000 ￿1:226 ￿1:118
Quintiles of household wealth (base: 1st quintile)
2nd quintile 0:304 0:000 0:219 0:389
3rd quintile 0:388 0:000 0:316 0:460
4th quintile 0:443 0:000 0:385 0:501
5th quintile 0:649 0:000 0:594 0:704
Proxy respondent on payroll income 0:617 0:000 0:552 0:681
Proxy respondent on self-employment income 0:469 0:000 0:340 0:599
CAPI ￿0:072 0:000 ￿0:113 ￿0:032
Edu-inter 0:710 0:000 0:619 0:802
Sex-inter 0:297 0:000 0:257 0:337
Age-inter 0:192 0:000 0:147 0:237
Comprehension 0:046 0:000 0:035 0:057
(1) Income from ￿nancial transfers is omitted for multicollinearity. (2) Cut-o⁄s and their standard errors are not displayed.
41Table 18. Distribution of respondents according
to the estimated number of response errors







> 5 2.9 100.0
Table 19. Response error by household tenths
Household tenths percent. share of mean (e)
response error response error
up to 1st decile 0:0 10
from 1st to 2nd decile 0:1 40
from 2nd to 3rd decile 0:3 192
from 3rd to 4th decile 0:6 430
from 4th to 5th decile 1:2 843
from 5th to 6th decile 2:2 1;523
from 6th to 7th decile 4:0 2;720
from 7th to 8th decile 7:7 5;265
from 8th to 9th decile 16:7 11;392
over the 9th decile 67:2 45;815
Average response error=4;013; Gini = 0:799:
42Figure 1: Change in earnings distribution (kernel density estimate)
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 767.1471
Payroll income
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth =  2.6e+03
Income from self employment
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 769.1091
Pensions and transfers
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 363.4021
Actual rents
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 500.0000
Imputed rents
kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 14.2054
Income from financial assets
ex ante
ex post
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